fix(security): Add auth middleware to unprotected API endpoints
Security audit identified 8 endpoint groups that were publicly accessible
without authentication. Added authMiddleware and requireRole where appropriate.
Protected endpoints:
- /api/payloads/* - authMiddleware (trusted origins or API token)
- /api/job-queue/* - authMiddleware + requireRole('admin')
- /api/workers/* - authMiddleware
- /api/worker-registry/* - authMiddleware (pods access via trusted IPs)
- /api/k8s/* - authMiddleware + requireRole('admin')
- /api/pipeline/* - authMiddleware + requireRole('admin')
- /api/tasks/* - authMiddleware + requireRole('admin')
- /api/admin/orchestrator/* - authMiddleware + requireRole('admin')
Also:
- Added API_SECURITY.md documentation
- Filter AI settings from /settings page (managed in /ai-settings)
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
175
backend/docs/API_SECURITY.md
Normal file
175
backend/docs/API_SECURITY.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
|
||||
# API Security Documentation
|
||||
|
||||
This document describes the authentication and authorization configuration for all CannaiQ API endpoints.
|
||||
|
||||
## Authentication Methods
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Trusted Origins (No Token Required)
|
||||
|
||||
Requests from trusted sources are automatically authenticated with `internal` role:
|
||||
|
||||
**Trusted IPs:**
|
||||
- `127.0.0.1` (localhost IPv4)
|
||||
- `::1` (localhost IPv6)
|
||||
- `::ffff:127.0.0.1` (IPv4-mapped IPv6)
|
||||
|
||||
**Trusted Domains:**
|
||||
- `https://cannaiq.co`
|
||||
- `https://www.cannaiq.co`
|
||||
- `https://findadispo.com`
|
||||
- `https://www.findadispo.com`
|
||||
- `https://findagram.co`
|
||||
- `https://www.findagram.co`
|
||||
- `http://localhost:3010`
|
||||
- `http://localhost:8080`
|
||||
- `http://localhost:5173`
|
||||
|
||||
**Trusted Patterns:**
|
||||
- `*.cannabrands.app`
|
||||
- `*.cannaiq.co`
|
||||
|
||||
**Internal Header:**
|
||||
- `X-Internal-Request` header matching `INTERNAL_REQUEST_SECRET` env var
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Bearer Token Authentication
|
||||
|
||||
External requests must include a valid token:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Authorization: Bearer <token>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Token Types:**
|
||||
- **JWT Token**: User session tokens (7-day expiry)
|
||||
- **API Token**: Long-lived tokens for integrations (stored in `api_tokens` table)
|
||||
|
||||
## Authorization Levels
|
||||
|
||||
### Public (No Auth)
|
||||
Routes accessible without authentication:
|
||||
- `GET /health` - Health check
|
||||
- `GET /api/health/*` - Comprehensive health endpoints
|
||||
- `GET /outbound-ip` - Server's outbound IP
|
||||
- `GET /api/v1/deals` - Public deals endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
### Authenticated (Trusted Origin or Token)
|
||||
Routes requiring authentication but no specific role:
|
||||
|
||||
| Route | Description |
|
||||
|-------|-------------|
|
||||
| `/api/payloads/*` | Raw crawl payload access |
|
||||
| `/api/workers/*` | Worker monitoring |
|
||||
| `/api/worker-registry/*` | Worker registration and heartbeats |
|
||||
| `/api/stores/*` | Store CRUD |
|
||||
| `/api/products/*` | Product listing |
|
||||
| `/api/dispensaries/*` | Dispensary data |
|
||||
|
||||
### Admin Only (Requires `admin` or `superadmin` role)
|
||||
Routes restricted to administrators:
|
||||
|
||||
| Route | Description |
|
||||
|-------|-------------|
|
||||
| `/api/job-queue/*` | Job queue management |
|
||||
| `/api/k8s/*` | Kubernetes control (scaling) |
|
||||
| `/api/pipeline/*` | Pipeline stage transitions |
|
||||
| `/api/tasks/*` | Task queue management |
|
||||
| `/api/admin/orchestrator/*` | Orchestrator dashboard |
|
||||
| `/api/admin/trusted-origins/*` | Manage trusted origins |
|
||||
| `/api/admin/debug/*` | Debug endpoints |
|
||||
|
||||
**Note:** The `internal` role (localhost/trusted origins) bypasses role checks, granting automatic admin access for local development and internal services.
|
||||
|
||||
## Endpoint Security Matrix
|
||||
|
||||
| Endpoint Group | Auth Required | Role Required | Notes |
|
||||
|----------------|---------------|---------------|-------|
|
||||
| `/api/payloads/*` | Yes | None | Query API for raw crawl data |
|
||||
| `/api/job-queue/*` | Yes | admin | Legacy job queue (deprecated) |
|
||||
| `/api/workers/*` | Yes | None | Worker status monitoring |
|
||||
| `/api/worker-registry/*` | Yes | None | Workers register via trusted IPs |
|
||||
| `/api/k8s/*` | Yes | admin | K8s scaling controls |
|
||||
| `/api/pipeline/*` | Yes | admin | Store pipeline transitions |
|
||||
| `/api/tasks/*` | Yes | admin | Task queue CRUD |
|
||||
| `/api/admin/orchestrator/*` | Yes | admin | Orchestrator metrics/alerts |
|
||||
| `/api/admin/trusted-origins/*` | Yes | admin | Auth bypass management |
|
||||
| `/api/v1/*` | Varies | Varies | Public API (per-endpoint) |
|
||||
| `/api/consumer/*` | Varies | Varies | Consumer features |
|
||||
|
||||
## Implementation Details
|
||||
|
||||
### Middleware Stack
|
||||
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
// Authentication middleware - validates token or trusted origin
|
||||
import { authMiddleware } from '../auth/middleware';
|
||||
|
||||
// Role requirement middleware - checks user role
|
||||
import { requireRole } from '../auth/middleware';
|
||||
|
||||
// Usage in route files:
|
||||
router.use(authMiddleware); // All routes need auth
|
||||
router.use(requireRole('admin', 'superadmin')); // Admin-only routes
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Auth Middleware Flow
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Request → Check Bearer Token
|
||||
├─ Valid JWT → Set user from token → Continue
|
||||
├─ Valid API Token → Set user as api_token role → Continue
|
||||
└─ No Token → Check Trusted Origin
|
||||
├─ Trusted → Set user as internal role → Continue
|
||||
└─ Not Trusted → 401 Unauthorized
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Role Check Flow
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Request → authMiddleware → requireRole('admin')
|
||||
├─ role === 'internal' → Continue (bypass)
|
||||
├─ role in ['admin', 'superadmin'] → Continue
|
||||
└─ else → 403 Forbidden
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Worker Pod Authentication
|
||||
|
||||
Worker pods (in Kubernetes) authenticate via:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Internal IP**: Pods communicate via cluster IPs, which are trusted
|
||||
2. **Internal Header**: Optional `X-Internal-Request` header for explicit trust
|
||||
|
||||
Endpoints used by workers:
|
||||
- `POST /api/worker-registry/register` - Report for duty
|
||||
- `POST /api/worker-registry/heartbeat` - Stay alive
|
||||
- `POST /api/worker-registry/deregister` - Graceful shutdown
|
||||
- `POST /api/worker-registry/task-completed` - Report task completion
|
||||
|
||||
## API Token Management
|
||||
|
||||
API tokens are managed via:
|
||||
- `GET /api/api-tokens` - List tokens
|
||||
- `POST /api/api-tokens` - Create token
|
||||
- `DELETE /api/api-tokens/:id` - Revoke token
|
||||
|
||||
Token properties:
|
||||
- `token`: The bearer token value
|
||||
- `name`: Human-readable identifier
|
||||
- `rate_limit`: Requests per minute
|
||||
- `expires_at`: Optional expiration
|
||||
- `active`: Enable/disable toggle
|
||||
- `allowed_endpoints`: Optional endpoint restrictions
|
||||
|
||||
## Security Best Practices
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Never expose tokens in URLs** - Use Authorization header
|
||||
2. **Use HTTPS in production** - All traffic encrypted
|
||||
3. **Rotate API tokens periodically** - Set expiration dates
|
||||
4. **Monitor rate limits** - Prevent abuse
|
||||
5. **Audit access logs** - Track API usage via `api_usage_logs` table
|
||||
|
||||
## Related Files
|
||||
|
||||
- `src/auth/middleware.ts` - Auth middleware implementation
|
||||
- `src/routes/api-tokens.ts` - Token management endpoints
|
||||
- `src/middleware/apiTokenTracker.ts` - Usage tracking
|
||||
- `src/middleware/trustedDomains.ts` - Domain trust markers
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user